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Note on Lindahl Equilibria and the 
Core of an Economy with a Public Good 
Mikio Nakayama 
Abstract: The relationship between Lindahl equilibria and the core of an 
economy with a public good is examined under the assumption that every 
coalition plays a non-cooperative game against its complementary coalition 
in sharing the cost for the public good. It is shown that the Lindahl 
equilibrium is contained in the core if and only if it is unblocked by any 
one-person coalition, and this is interpreted in terms of the free rider. 
1 . In this note, we examine the wellknown relationship between 
Lindahl equilibria and the core of an economy with pure public goods under 
a specific assumption imposed on the activities of coalitions of agents. The 
result of Foley [2] that Lindahl equilibria are contained in the core was 
derived under a conservative assumption on permissible activities of the 
complementary coalition. That is, any coalition must produce the public 
goods for itself without assuming any contribution of the complementary 
coalition in blocking the allocation of the economy. As a result the core 
is quite large as mentioned by Foley himself. In fact, Champsauer [1] 
showed in a game theoretic framework that for every coalition, and hence 
for every one-person coalition, too, there exist core allocations which are 
attainable for it. 
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Alternative views on what a coalition can achieve for itself in situations 
involving externalities have been proposed and examined by Rosenthal [5] 
or Richter 〔4]. The latter derived necessary conditions for the core to 
disappear under the assumption that the complementary coalition contributes 
to the public good provision subject to certain rationality constraints. We 
shall also take an alternative view as to how the complementary coalition 
reacts, which might be a variation of the rationality constraint proposed 
by Richter [ 4]. Specifically, we consider the case where a coalition and 
its complement act as players of a two person non-cooperative game in 
sharing the cost of a public good to be produced. Then every coalition 
is associated with its utility level defined at the Nash equilibrium point in 
the set of the pairs of payments decided strategically. Thus we obtain a 
characteristic function game which describes the power of each coalition to 
block the outcome, i. e., utility levels assured under the Lindahl equilibrium, 
m our case. 
In this framework it is shown that the Lindahl equilibrium belongs to 
the core if and only if it is unblocked by any one-person coalition. This 
result can be interpreted in terms of the free rider in a public goods economy 
defined precisely by e. g., Kaneko〔3].
2. Our economy consists simply of n agents, one public good and freely 
transferable money. N = {1，…，n} is the set of al agents, and a coalition is 
a nonempty subset S of N. Each agent is assumed to have sufficiently 
large quantity of money. The public good is pure, i. e., consumed collec-
tively and equally by al agents in N. The utility gained by agent i from 
consuming q amount of the public good is given by u;(q), which is assumed 
to be measured in terms of money. The cost needed to produce q amount 
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of the public good is given by C(q) for al coalitions. We assume: 
ui(q) is differentiable on (0, oo) with ui’＞O,u／’く0and lim zイ（q)
q→＋∞ 
=O, and satisfies ui(O) =O. 
C ( q)is linear and increasing in q ( qミ0),and C(O) =O. 
（司
??
The Lindahl equilibrium in this economy is the pair (P；む＝CP1，…九；の
(1) 
(2) 
such that 
u;(q) -P/j = max(ui(qi)-Piqi) for al ieN 
Qi注O
L: p/.j-C(q) =max( I; Piq-C(q)) 
ieN qミ0 ieN 
Lindahl imputation is the payoff vector x = （ニど1,…，xn) defined by 
(3) ろ＝ui(q)-piq
where (P：の isthe Lindahl equilibrium. 
for al ieN, 
Let Let Q(T) be an inverse function of C(q), i. e., C(Q(T)) =T. 
fsCts,tN-5) be a function defined for al ScN by 
fs(ts, tN-s) = ~ ui(Q(ts+tN-s))-ts・ 
teS 
Let t~ be defined for al Sc N by 
f5(t~ ， O)=max f5(t5,Q). 
t；，ミO
羽Tesay t~ is an individual cost for S, which is the cost needed for S to 
(4) 
(5) 
total utility without any produce the public good that attains maximal 
contribution from N -S. 
For arbitrary S fixed, the pair (tf, t~＿ 5) is a Nash equilibrium if 
fs(t~ ， tt-s) =max fs(ts, tt-s) 
fs二三O
We need the following Lemma which characterizes the Nash equilibrium. 
(6) for S and N-S. 
Then, Let t*= (t~ ， tt-s) be the Nash equilibrium. 
t~十tt-s =max{t~ ， t~＿ 5}, 
t~ ＝ O if t~くtr;,_s·
Lemma. 
）??
??
（
）???
?
． ，
?
（
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Though the proof follows straightforwardly from Kaneko [3, Corollary], we 
shall state it here for completeness. 
Proof. Let T*=t~ ＋tt-s, and let T0=max {t~ ， t~－5}. 
( i) Suppose T*> T0. 
Them, f5(T大0）くf5(T0,0) for S and N-S. 
Since every ui is strictly concave, we have 
df5(T, 0) I aλCts, tN-s) I lー《｜くo.
dT I ot5 I 
T=T* t=t* 
Since T*>O, we may well assume t~＞O. 
Then for sufficiently small o>O, we have 
fs(tfー δ，場－s)-fs(t'+;, tt-s) 
afs I ＝~I (-o)+o(o)>O, 
where lim o(o)/o=O. 
This contradicts that t* is a Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose T＊くY0. Then for S with t~ = Y0, we have 
八（Y0,0) > fs(T*, 0) . 
Then we are led to a contradiction in a similar way. 
(i) It suffices to show that 
0 fs(ts, tp_s) I 
ots s iくo.
This follows immediately from the proof of (i), since Y*=tr;._5>t~. Q. E. D. 
Under the Nash equilibrium the coalition that bears the cost for the public 
good is the one for which the individual cost is greater, and the complem-
entary coalition bears no cost. 
However if it happens that t~ =t,$_5, then t* is not uniquely determined. 
To avoid this difficulty for our purpose, we shall simply assume that 
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(C) t~千t?v-s for al S cN. 
We can then define utility level v(S) each coalition S can assure under the 
Nash equilibrium by v(S) = fs(tt, t"'t-s), i. e., 
( ~ ui(Q(t~））－ t~ if t~＞t?v』S
v(S) = ~ ieS 
/ I; ui(Q(t'lr-s)) if dくt?v-s
¥ ieS 
(7) 
Thus we obtain a game in characteristic function form represented by (N, v). 
For S with t~＞t?v-s，り（s) is the same to the one defined under the usual 
asssumption on the activities of N-S. When t~くt?,_5, the coalition S is 
just free riding on the benefit spilled over from N -S. 
The core of the game (N, v) is the set of payoff vectors x= (x1, ・・, xn) 
satisfying 
,L; Xiミv(S) for al ScN and I; xi=v(N). 
ieS ieN 
We want to know if the core of this game contains the Lindahl equilibrium 
of this economy. 
3. We prove: 
Proposition. Assume that 
(d) t0 {i）くt~－｛ il for al icN. 
Then the Lindahl imputation x belongs to the core if and only if 
xi~v( {i}) for al isN. 
Proof The “only if”part is trivial. To show the converse, we first prove 
that 
Q(t~） 三三 Q(t~） if RcS. 
Suppose Q(t~） >Q(t~）. Then by the monotonicity of u;, we have 
u,(Q(t~））＞ui(Q(t~））. 
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(8) 
Hence, 
fs(t~ ， 0) = "£ U;(Q(t~）） 一月
isS 
= －~ ui(Q(t~）） 一月＋"£ u;(Q(t0)) 
ieR ieS-R 
くZU;(Q(t~））－ t~ ＋ "£ Ui(Q(t~）） 
ieR ieS-R 
= "£ ui(Q(t~））－ t~ 
おS
Z玉fs(t~ ， O).
This is a contradiction. 
Let t~ くt~－s ・ Then in view of (d) and (8) we have 
"£ xiミ：；"£ v( {i}) = "£ ui(Q(t~－｛iJ)) 
iεS ieS ieS 
三Z U;(t~＿5)) ＝り（s).
ieS 
Let t~＞t'lv--s. Then by the definition of the Lindahl equilibrium and the 
linearity of C(q) we have 
"£ xi="£ (u；（を）－P8)
iεS ieS 
三ZU;(Q(t~））－ "£ P;Q(t~） 
ieS isS 
="£ ui(Q(t~））－＂£ P;C(Q(t~））／＂£ P; 
iεS icS ieN 
ミ三Z U;(Q(t~））－ t? 
i•S 
＝り（S).
The equality "£ x; = v(N) is clear. Q. E. D. 
ieN 
Thus if the Lindahl imputation is unblocked by any one-person coalition, 
it is contained in the core. Under the assumption (d), v( {i}) describes the 
benefit of agent i gained by consuming the public good produced out of 
cooperation of al agents except i. In other words, v({i}) is a gain to i 
obtainable by acting unilaterally as a free rider. Then the condition for 
the Lindahl equilibrium to be contained in the core of the game (N, v) 
amounts to saying that no agent be incited to act as a free rider under the 
Lindahl equilibrium. 
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Nonemptiness of the core of this game depends on the shape of each 
utility function. The following example indicates that it is rather an exce-
ption under the assumption (d). This in turn implies that the Lindahl 
epuilibrium is not likely to be achieved, as the free rider problem in a 
public goods economy suggests. 
Consider the example: 
N={l,2,3} 
u;(q) =arv'互（α；＞O)
C(q) =cq (c>O) 
Then the followings are easy to obtain: 
り（N)=(a1+a2十a3)2/4c
り（{i})＝向（aj十九）／2c
a；くajートak
The core is empty, since 
v(N)-~ v({i}) ＝〔（a1＋向十a3)2-4(a1a2＋α1a3＋α内）］／4c
ieN 
={[a1一（az+a3）］αl十［α2一（a3+a1）］α2＋〔aa一（a1+a2)]a3}/4c
くO
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